A couple of months ago, I completed my first course in an Intelligence Studies masters program; I'll be sharing my work here, and on http://gradschoolfool.blogspot.com/ (my old grad school blog), for anyone interested in this kind of thing.

This is a follow-up post to Theories of intelligence (spying, not IQ). This is NOT a formatted post. It will reprise some of the discussion on last week's post, and then will be a copy of my weekly notes. In future versions of the Discussion and Notes, the notes section will be easier to read, because I took the time to think about Steemit formatting while I was taking down my notes.

In the discussion section, I limit my archiving to what I said; I don't know if there is an academic prohibition on using other's work publicly, but it seems wrong to me.

My own commentary in these notes is usually proceeded by "ME:"

I am glad I am rehashing these notes, because I had just tossed them onto the storage drive and forgot about them. It turns out there is a clear theme of bias and how to understand it running through the notes. I chose not to inlcude most of that in the paper (see link above), but it's nice to be able to go back through and have a second look at the concept, especially in relation to my writing here on Steemit.

Discussion

Some theories are wrong,; some are wrong because they are set up on anti-scientific principle (post-modern, constructivist, marxist, "critical" studies, etc etc)
Some theories are wrong place, wrong time...a theory can be right when the theory matches the conditions of a situation. it's like controlling for ALL variables; easy to do in a lab, not so easy in complicated (especially human) situations.

…

1- "I return to my point from the last discussion: the primary duty/mission of the American intelligence community is the protection against America." was edited to "I return to my point from the last discussion: the primary duty/mission of the American intelligence community is the protection of America."

2- “I keep six honest serving-men
(They taught me all I knew);
Their names are What and Why and When
And How and Where and Who”
(Kipling, 1902/1988, p. 3)

I knew I had seen this as I read this week...from the Ellis/Levy article
…

Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) targeting methodology

…
Great point regarding the assumption of rational decision makers.
ideally, an intelligence agency would be able to inform the decision makers on THEIR side as to whether the other guy had the same standards of rationality.
I just used this last week, but one of the reasons our decision-making in re the Iraq War was faulty was because we didn't understand what Hussein considered rational or not
Duelfer, C. A., & Dyson, S. B. (2011). Chronic Misperception and International Confict:The U.S.-Iraq Experience. International Security, 36(1), 28.
…

I think you will find that personal biases do play a part in how methodologies are derived.
Smith and Noble (2014), although coming from a nursing viewpoint, make the following points:

• first, bias exists in all research, across research designs and is difficult to eliminate;
• second, bias can occur at each stage of the research process;
• third, bias impacts on the validity and reliability of study findings and misinterpretation of data can have important consequences for practice.
  And while an institution may have a bias (procedure or policy) in the way that intelligence is processed, any given practitoner may also have a bias (familiarity heuristic)towards the first method he learned, or had a success with.
  Smith, J., & Noble, H. (2014). Bias in research. Evidence Based Nursing, 17(4), 100–101. https://doi.org/10.1136/eb-2014-101946
  …

Notes

• Ellis, Timothy J. and Yair Levy. 2008. “Framework of Problem-Based Research: A Guide for Novice Researchers on the Development of a Research-Worthy Problem.” Informing Science: The International Journal of an Emerging Transdiscipline 11: 17-33. Accessed December 1, 2016. http://inform.nu/ArticlesVol11/ISp017-033Ellis486.pdf
  “ Implicit in the definition of a research problem are:
  ƒ Problems are active. A missed opportunity does not necessarily constitute a problem. Parents
  have, for example, a missed opportunity for training toddlers to use automatic weapons, but it
  is doubtable if anyone in his right mind would seriously consider that as a viable research
  problem.”

ME: why not? Ninja babies require fewer rations in the field? ;>

“ . First, research-worthy problems should
not be based solely on personal observations and/or experiences. Although a researcher may have
a “hunch for the problem”, an identifiable literature that documents the problem or literature that
documents conflicting results should be the basis for a research-worthy problem (Kerlinger &
Lee, 2000).”

ME: and what happens when no one else has found the problem to be worth risking that next two-week paycheck?

Examples: dearth of research on do-gooding and rent-seeking (outside business-government corruption) material in academia

“ In general “the problem usually begins with vague and/or unscientific thoughts or unsystematic hunches. It then goes through a series of refinement steps” (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p.
15). Novice researchers may have some “hunches” but it is vital that they properly anchor them in
the context of the existing body of knowledge.”

• Scott, L., & Jackson, P. (2004). The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice. Intelligence & National Security, 19(2), 139–169. https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302930
  “ Sherman Kent’s classic characterisations of intelligence cover the ‘the three separate and distinct things that intelligence devotees usually mean when they use the word’; these are: knowledge, the type of organisation that produces
  that knowledge and the activities pursued by that organisation”
  “ This is perhaps because, as James Der Derian has observed, intelligence is the ‘least understood and most ‘‘undertheorized’’ area of international relations’.”

ME: let’s not limit the discussion of intel to international relations; intel should be used before ANY complicated operation, military, governmental, or business.
(note to self – they answer this). However the use of government intel should also include domestic security and anti-crime consideration (fix sentence)

“ Elizabeth Anderson has
argued: ‘the specific subject of covert action as an element of intelligence has
suffered a deficiency of serious study’”

ME: hence, covert

3 approaches

• “ The first approach, favoured among international historians in particular, but also characteristic of theoretical approaches that seek to explain the relationship between organisational structure and policy making, conceives of the study of intelligence primarily as a means of acquiring new information in order to explain specific decisions made by policy makers in both peace and war”

• “ second approach strives to establish general models that can explain success and failure in the intelligence process.”

• “ third approach focuses instead on the political function of intelligence as a means of state control.”

“ The best writing about intelligence incorporates all three of the above approaches in different ways. But there are nearly always differences in emphasis even in the seminal works that have been crucial in pushing research forward. At the heart of these divergences, arguably, is disagreement concerning the extent to which political assumptions and political culture
shape the intelligence process at all levels”

following up with
“Christopher Andrew, for example, argues in this collection that, ‘For the conceptual framework of intelligence studies to advance further, it is essential to make a clearer distinction than is usually made at present between the roles of intelligence communities in authoritarian and democratic regimes.’2”

ME: no, it’s not. Intel is a tool like a gun. While republican and tyrannical ideologies can both use a gun, they use it for different purposes. The tool itself remains the same. To understand things in the sense that Andrew does necessitates a study to understand the difference between the ideologies themselves.

“ Intelligence is all but absent, conversely, in the work of most international relations theorists, and does not figure in key IR theory debates between realist, liberal, institutionalist, constructivist and post-modernist approaches.”

“ post-modernism rejects the notion of an
absolute truth,”
ME: postmoderinsm is, was, and always will be absolute garbage; however finally got an explanation of what this quai-academic jibber-jabber is based on...I always thought it was just a vehicle for more socialist brainwashing.

“ Recent constructivist theorising about the importance of identity and political culture in shaping both elite and public perceptions of international politics is a case in point. Its focus on identity as a central factor in the process of
threat identification has obvious relevance to the study of security and intelligence. The same is true with the emphasis on cultural–institutional contexts of security policy”

public choice?
ME: Point of an intel agency is to protect that political entity to which it serves.
-speaking truth to power” concept
Criticism of public use of intelligence
ME: HELLO, a republic must be as transparent as possible to serve the interest of the voting public. Yes, this includes intel

“ . For some academics the
Ivory Tower should remain a sanctuary from the compromises of
officialdom and provide a panorama (or, a camera obscura) on the world
outside. For others, academics are there to tell the world about the world.
Yet, while many academics aspire to policy relevance, intelligence is one
area where officialdom may remain sceptical about the value of engagement
with the academy”

ME: institutuional bias vs instituional bias

“ Sherman Kent in his arguably tautological observation that intelligence is
what intelligence services do. “
“ in the
view of some scholars, the history of covert action compels revision of the
historical and political accounts of the Cold War, and fatally weakens the
view that the US policy was simply concerned with containment.52 “

me: wtf were they smoking?

“ Herman has argued that intelligence
requires ‘a similar ethical foundation’ to the use of armed force. An equally
telling and compelling observation is his view that ‘Ethics should be
recognized as a factor in intelligence decisions, just as in anything else.”
And the primary ethical consideration is the defense of the country they are paid to serve.
“ In his famous essay on ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’, Max
Weber observes that ‘No ethics in the world can get round the fact that the
achievement of ‘‘good’’ ends is in many cases tied to the necessity of
employing morally suspect or at least morally dangerous means.”
ME: I.e, bribing traitors to other countries...or compromising them

“ The crux of
the issue, according to Weber, is a crucial dilemma of politics: that the
interests of particular communities or polities will not always be compatible
with the wider interests of humanity. Weber rejects the universalist
assumptions of the ‘ethics of principled conviction’ for their disregard of
the consequences of political choice. He argues instead that the first
responsibility of those involved in politics must be to their own community”
ME: bingo
ME: study of ethics and intelligence

“ One reason why there are conspiracy theories is because there are conspiracies. Indeed the history of covert action is the history of conspiracy. While it would be simplistic to suggest that the former begat the latter, covert action is
nevertheless the sturdy twin of conspiracy theory”

• Kahn, D. (2001). An historical theory of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 16(3), 79–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306220
  “no one has proposed concepts that can be tested. “

• Philip H.J. Davies, ‘Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts
  and Institutions’, Harvard International Review (Autumn 2002),
  “Virtually all intelligence theory could be considered a footnote to Kent. His conviction that intelligence should be a broad-based analytical discipline is embodied in his maxim “intelligence is knowledge,” which has set the precedent for most subsequent debate.”

“in British practice, raw intelligence moves straight into policymaking circles without passing through a separate, intervening analytical stage. This is not because there is no assessment process but because all-source analysis is subsumed by the civil service employees who, in their role as advisors to ministers of the crown, take ultimate responsibility for the policies and actions of their departments before Parliament.”

• Lillbacka, R. G. V. (2013). Realism, Constructivism, and Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(2), 304–331. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.732450

“ The current rapid expansion of Intelligence Studies1 is being driven by an
increased need for intelligence in an unpredictable post-post Cold War
world2 that features complex operational contexts requiring special
expertise,3 private contractors increasingly performing core intelligence
functions,4 and intelligence missions expanding into completely new fields
such as humanitarian action.5 “
ME:
1- the world has always been unpredictable
2- every human action requires” complex operational contexts”
3- special expertise can be, and often is overrated
4- the use of private companies to do tasks that should be done by sworn personeel is insane, and flies in the purpose of national intel needs
5- “completely new fields” means nothing in trems of “ complex operational contexts”

“ the hitherto fruitless search for a
‘‘theory of intelligence’’ has been rekindled.6 Considering developments in
adjacent disciplines, epistemological issues will, in all likelihood,
increasingly come into focus.7 Among them: What is ‘‘knowledge’’ in
intelligence, and what counts as ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘justified’’ knowledge, if any?”

“ Dr. Philip Davies’s warning about

theoretical perspectives far removed from operational reality pertains:
The idea that the individuals advising the chief executives of nuclear
armed states might become bogged down . . . over the relative merits of
Marxism, functionalism, Lacanian psychoanalysis or whose viewpoint
was false or emancipatory consciousness, simply does not bear thinking
about.”

ME: anyone STILL arguing any merit to marxism at this time in history is both dishonest and a loon

“ Even if intelligence lacks an explicit ‘‘theory,’’ it does not lack an epistemology, although it
may be largely tacit.”

epistemology → the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope. Epistemology is the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion.

“ constructivism may seem close to the craft of intelligence where uncertainty and ambiguity are the rule rather than the exception, and the individual’s own subjective mind and social and professional context are major sources of fallibility.”

constructivism →
Constructivist epistemology → “Constructivist epistemology is a branch in philosophy of science maintaining that scientific knowledge is constructed by the scientific community, who seek to measure and construct models of the natural world. Natural science therefore consists of mental constructs that aim to explain sensory experience and measurements.
According to constructivists, the world is independent of human minds, but knowledge of the world is always a human and social construction.[1] Constructivism opposes the philosophy of objectivism, embracing the belief that a human can come to know the truth about the natural world not mediated by scientific approximations with different degrees of validity and accuracy. “
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivist_epistemology

“ Intelligence is a craft where key
assumptions should be continuously questioned. But openness to
contradictory views does not imply acceptance of their validity, and
consequently, I argue that constructivism has hitherto been unable to
present anything that would benefit Intelligence Studies, especially
concerning intelligence analysis”

ME: art/craft vs science
comparison to police science (see Willis, J. J. (2013). Improving police: What’s craft got to do with it? Ideas in American Policing, 16. Retrieved from https://www.policefoundation.org/sites/g/files/g798246/f/201306/IAP16_Willis_2.pdf)
intelligence as an art or craft, while intelligence studies is a science?
IF expecting intelligence as a craft/art to be informed by intelligence studies as a aceince, then theories about intelligence matter more, otherwise chasing our tails
“ my focus is exclusively on intelligence analysis, under the presumption that it may be principally affected by academic trends since it is the methodological manifestation of any implicit or elaborate ‘‘theory of intelligence.’’ Obviously, any workable theory of intelligence would not be merely a theory ‘‘about’’ intelligence,
but also support intelligence by providing directions for how it should be conducted”

“ the usefulness of any theoretical or epistemological notion can be assessed based on its impact on intelligence
analysis.”

“ My central thesis is that intelligence analysis is inherently realist, should remain so, and has nothing to gain from contemporary constructivism. This claim is founded on three arguments: (1) Constructivist epistemology
is inconsistent and implies that any knowledge is impossible; (2) ‘‘Weak constructivism’’ adhering to traditional epistemological assumptions does not provide anything novel when compared to realist research; and (3)
Constructivism is antithetical to intelligence analysis. Indeed, a reading of the 2011 volumes of the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence and Intelligence and National Security reveals not a
single case of constructivist writing, merely somewhat constructivist themes treated in a realist manner.12 My first two arguments are founded on a review of previous research, whereas the third is based on my examination
of three recent works on intelligence analysis to be detailed herein.”

“ All realist perspectives14 share certain key assumptions: (1) reality exists
independently of the subjective mind and of observations (the contrasting
idealist viewpoint claims that thoughts affect reality); (2) a ‘‘correspondence
theory of truth;’’ and (3) the fallibility of knowledge. Realism presents no
ontological postulates, but presumes that reality can be known through
(scientific) propositions that can be demonstrated to be either true or
false.

“ Induction, or inference from
repeated observations, cannot establish the truth, but deduction can refute
a proposition, whi ch is th e c entr al notion of Karl Popp er’s
hypothetical-deductive method. Hence, contrary to anti-realist claims,
realists do not claim to know the ‘‘objective truth.’’”

Popper →falsification

“ Studies in international relations experienced a ‘‘constructivist turn’’ in the
late 1980s, partly because postmodernism was a scientific ‘‘in thing.’’5”

compare to marxism as an “in thing” rather than examing it’s backtrail of genocide and economic destruction. “Critical” studies. Indeed, at the 2015 ACS meeting, approxiamtely ¼ seminars was related to the false narrative that Michael brown was shot in the back, with his hands up.

He brings up Sokal Affair! Yay Lillbacka!

“ Constructivism’s view on truth as subjective and contextual leads to a
paradoxical implication. Lacking any other standards of adjudication apart
from social convention, two groups could conceivably make completely
opposite truth claims that, according to constructivism, would be equally
valid.”

Heuer, R. J. (2007). Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (2nd Edition edition). Pherson Associates Llc.
(on shelf)
Clauser, J., & Goldman, J. (2008). An introduction to intelligence research and analysis. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press.
(on shelf)
“He (clauser) He even suggests that intelligence analysis is to some extent ‘‘antithetical’’ to science.”

• Orton, J. D., & Callahan, J. L. (1995). Important “folk theories” in intelligence reorganization. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 8(4), 411–429. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850609508435296

“ What value do organization theorists create? They generate vocabulary,
dimensions, metaphors, concepts, and models which are slowly absorbed by
organization members who use them to help shape decisions about organizational
structures.”

“ "Folk theories" — organizational theories as adopted by organization
members — illustrate inbred views or agency cultures.”

six theoretical traditions in organization theory
1-

a letter from George Washington dated
26 July 1777:
The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be
further urged. All that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most
Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated,
however well planned and promising a favourable issue.

“ Ames's arrest in February 1994 served as a further catalyst for the
reorganization of U.S. intelligence. At his sentencing in April, Ames read a
prepared statement which laid out his analysis of the CIA, the organization he
had worked for since high school. His most-frequently cited statement was his
description of the intelligence community as "a self-serving sham, carried out by
careerist bureaucrats who have managed to deceive several generations of
policymakers and the public”

ME: is there a supposed benefit to academic theory over folk theory in intelligence work?

“ As early as March 1993, Woolsey had made it clear in testimony before the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that restructuring in a
sensitive, classified organization, especially with regard to personnel, must not be
conducted in haste. Woolsey told the committee: "I would strongly recommend
that we move no faster than attrition, augmented by early retirement incentives,
permits. Sharp personnel reductions and involuntary releases present a
particularly difficult problem in the intelligence profession”

“ The presence of multiple paradigms is a natural state of affairs in organization
theory, as practiced in its natural habitat — reorganization decision processes. To
successfully represent the organizational realities they purport to study,
organization theorists will have to become more adept at managing multiple
organization theories.”

“ deception is a human construction, not a
product of physiology or evolution”
ME: nitpickinmg here, but aren’t human contructions a means of staisfying the evoltuionary need to survivie and reproduce?

“ Deception may also be the result of
self-deception when a congenial illusion is preferred to objective reality.”

ME: I.e; post-modern, marxisit, critical studeis . Etc “theory”
“ Perceived reality can even repel hard evidence. In 1921, The New York Times
revealed that the widely circulated document The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion that offered evidence of a malevolent Jewish plot for world
domination was a forgery. The motor car magnate, Henry Ford, who had
long cited the work, noted after the revelation that ‘‘The only statement I
care to make about the Protocols is that they fit with what is going on.
They have fitted the world situation up to this time. They fit now.’’ Thus
to Ford, what ‘‘fitted’’ his predisposition was true—or at least valid.”

“ for two years the Allies invested enormous
effort in hiding the nature of Operation Overlord, the invasion of France,
offering false options, using hundreds of channels for thousands of ruses.
Plan Bodyguard created notional armies, deployed illusory radio networks,
false documents, used captured spies as channels and constructed tanks
and airplanes out of canvass, rubber, and plywood. Some of the ruses
became classics: Monty’s Double or the Man-Who-Never-Was and, in
Operation Fortitude’s ‘‘Quicksilver’’ plan—the ‘‘Army Group Patton’’
(FUSAG), seemingly based in East Anglia waiting—even after D-Day—to
strike at Calais. “

“ To contrive and deploy ruses, to seek to deceive a target, is, more often
than not, done without recourse to theory or even a clear understanding of
the deception process”

“ a contest in opposing ruses that arise
from experience and necessity”

link to realist approach for intel theory

“t he American
military has often generated work on the value and application of
deception and has employed deception, but without the need of a basic
theoretical foundation, “

• JOHNSON, L. K. (2003). Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16(4), 638–663. https://doi.org/10.1080/716100470

“ the core theoretical and practical question regarding
intelligence—a nation’s ‘‘first line of defense’’2—is, similarly, how much is
enough? How much clandestine knowledge about and action against
adversaries does a modern nation require to defend itself, both at home
and abroad?”

“ In the United States, journalist Walter Lippmann
and, more recently, historian Paul Kennedy attracted attention for their
articulate presentation of the thesis that Americans had become too
involved overseas, suffering from ‘‘imperial overstretch’’ in Kennedy’s
phrase. :

ME: there is a difference between a military presence and an intelligence capacity; we don’t necessarily need a military presence all over the globe, but we damn well better have an intel presence

“ unless a new set of hard-liners induce a self-fulfilling
prophecy by leading the United States into a hostile stance toward the
Chinese, which in turn creates fear and resentment in Beijing and a
spiraling cycle of animosity between the two nations”

Yes, Loch, only the presence of “hard-liners” in the US government could turn a country which genocided it’s own people for too much ungood thought into an enemy of liberty and free market.

“ Even in the absence of clear-cut goals and adversaries, a nation will establish
at least a working list of intelligence interests (‘‘requirements,’’ ‘‘tasks,’’ or
‘‘targets’’), a set of related intelligence missions, and—depending on its
affluence—a small, medium, or large espionage infrastructure to carry out
surveillance and sometimes more aggressive secret operations against the
nations, factions, and individuals it has selected to watch. Targeting is
based on a ‘‘threat assessment,’’ that is, a studied determination of what
forces in the world can bring harm to one’s nation and its interests.”

“ have matters of international
economics now become more important than political or even military
issues?”

Economic threats pose a mostly unrecognized danger to America, Nando argues that "National security depends also on soft power, the ability of a country to generate and use its economic power and to project its national values" (2011, summary).
Nando, D. (2011). Economics and national security: Issues and implications for U.S. policy. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved April 23, 2015 from http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41589.pdf

ME: Jiohnson gets into ethics, but since we’ll get into that later this semester, i’ll leave it be for now.

“ If sufficiently affluent, a nation will seek to maximize its inventory of
intelligence modus operandi. ...Most of America’s $30 billion spent annually
on intelligence goes toward the purchase and operation of these glittering
techint platforms”

interesting note re: analysts producing data they are interested in, rather than what policymakers want

“ he secret agencies also
initiated their own unlawful programs, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI) counterintelligence operations against Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., as well as other civil rights and antiwar activists
(code-named COINTELPRO), and the CIA’s spying against Vietnam War
dissenters (Operation CHAOS).”

ME:as usual Loch is wrong
The US president gave the green light for each and every COINTELPRO, the Kennedy brothers (presisdent and AG) gave their approval for operartions against MLK, and CHAOS originated with Nixon (or his staff)

“ it took scandals like
COINTELPRO and CHAOS in the 1970s to convince modern legislators
that these safeguards had to be applied not just to the government’s open
agencies but to its secret ones as well.42”

ME: and the actions that those legliasors took led directly to 9/11…

“ The opening question here was: how much intelligence is enough? The answer
depends on the scope of a nation’s foreign policy objectives, its sense of
danger at home and abroad, and its affluence. “

ME:GOOD GOD, Loch, could you at least TRY not tbe wrong so much?
A nation’s intelligence apparatus must be able to anticiapte ALL threats to the country, foreign, domestic, and natural.

“ what is the proper role of America in the world?—a deeply normative and
contentious question”

“ Grievous, too, has been the overzealous pursuit of intelligence operations
that have ended up violating U.S. law; at the extreme, officials have used
the secret agencies on occasion to spy against the very citizens they were
established to protect.”

ME: and when they are protecting good citizens from socialist citizens, domestic enemies, hmmmmm?

“ The key to intelligence theorybuilding is a better understanding of the relationship between foreign policy
goals and perceived threats, on the one hand, and intelligence targeting, on
the other. The more expansive the list of goals and threats, the
greater the number of targets. In turn, as the number of targets expands,
so will the size of the intelligence bureaucracy, along with the frequency
and scope of its missions, the volume of secrets it hoards, and the amount
of its annual budget.
Beyond these basics, a theory will have to take into account the most
significant inadequacies of intelligence, including its periodic irrelevance
and lack of timeliness, the frequent unwillingness of policymakers to
accept reliable information (often a function of pathologies in the
relationship between the producers and the consumers of intelligence), and
the risks posed to democracy by the politicization of information.
Grievous, too, has been the overzealous pursuit of intelligence operations
that have ended up violating U.S. law; at the extreme, officials have used
the secret agencies on occasion to spy against the very citizens they were
established to protect. The government has also engaged in particularly
unsavory activities abroad, such as tampering with electoral processes in
democratic regimes and the attempted murder of foreign leaders. These
excesses point to important normative considerations that must be a part
of any theoretical construct that addresses the fullness of strategic
intelligence, including attention to the place of procedural safeguards
designed to maintain accountability even within—especially within—the
hidden side of government.”

• Clauser, J., & Goldman, J. (2008). An introduction to intelligence research and analysis. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press.
  MODELS AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
  A concept that evolved in the physical sciences, but one that has ap
  plication in many other nonscientific investigations and particularly
  n intelligence analysis and research, is the concept of the model. In its
  simplest sense, a model is an abstraction or repeesentation of reality
  For example, chessmen are models irepresentations of combatants,
  and a chess game is a model of conflict, a chemical formula is a sym
  bolic representation (model) of a substance, a model airplane is a
  miniature repeesentation of the real thing (with many parts missing of
  coursel the naval war game described at the beginning of the chapter
  was a model of the actual conflict, and game theory is a model of po
  itical military or economic conflict, again with irelevant parts
  deleted Scientific theories are also models. The advantage of models
  s that they enable one to predict outcomes by manipulating only sym
  er than elements of the real world. The most common type of
  o is simulation
  litical,
  deleted. Scientific theories are also models. The advantage of models
  et, again with irrelevant parts
  is that they enable one to predict outcomes by manipulating only sym-
  bols rather than elements of the real world. The most common type of
  Symbol manipulation for predictive purposes is simulation.
  Whenever a researcher formulates a hypothesis that attempts to
  ccount for the interaction of variables, he is constructing a model.
  The formulation of the model is a creative act, hence the necessity for
  imagination discussed earlier. The quality of a model is a function of
  bow well it accounts for the interaction of variables. In scientific mod-
  cs quality is the extent to which the model predicts accurately. It is
  the act of determining how well a model explains or predicts that con-
  intes the scientific method
  Wery beily, the scientific method involves the following steps
  the scancher makes observations either directly or vicariously by
  ing eports of carlier observations and measurements, (2) the re
  fomuanes postulates a model that attempts to account for

wonscientific research as they are to validating a scientific predic
vant
model And with certain qualitications, the scientific method is a
riate methodology for intelligence research as well
Tecally intelligence rescarch or analysis begins when the re
wher makes observations Unlike the physical scientist, who may
erve his phenomena directly, the intelligence rescarcher or analyst
aly makes hi
ads
nts or other observers Based on his observations, he postu
tative explana
wcingThese initial
ations vicariously, that is, he studies docu
ellignce eports studies photographs, or interviews
s of what is taking place or why something
tative explanations are called working
These working bypotheses are examined in terms of pos
nd plausibility and
further
hpotheses that seem most plausible
and the hy
The
sted
hypothe

• Treverton, G. F., United States, & Intelligence Policy Center (U.S.) (Eds.). (2006). Toward a theory of intelligence: Workshop report. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.

“ To derive a theory first requires a definition. Because intelligence means many
things to many people, boiling it down to one single definition is difficult. Common
usage seems to embrace two definitions, which are sometimes used interchangeably. For
most people intelligence is “information for decisionmakers.” This is broad in scope and
includes all manner of decisionmakers, from business people to sports coaches to
policymakers. For others, though, intelligence is “secret state activity designed to
understand or influence foreign entities.””

“ Theories of intelligence may be explored in three main ways—historical,
mathematical, and psychological.”

“ A mathematical theory might quantify intelligence and so make it more precise and
amenable to testable prediction.”

ME: which requires CONSTANT varibales except in the varibale you are testing!!

“ To develop intelligence theory, it is important to first ask: “What is the point?” Is
the point to develop theories of intelligence to help academics research intelligence, come
to understand it, and better explain it to students and the public? Or should theories for
intelligence relate immediately to the needs of practitioners—gatherers, analysts, and
managers, along with consumers, politicians, and other executives? In one sense, there is
no conflict between these two. A good theory of intelligence should, by definition, be
useful for intelligence”

Me: ding, we have a winner

“ All social phenomena are susceptible to theory.
• “Theories are indispensable when it comes to explanation, since they
conceptualize causal mechanisms.”9”
“Concepts are crucial, not just for labeling empirical categories—“terrorist,” “spy,”
“agent,” “message”—but also for defining and discerning mechanisms and
structures, such as process, cycle, network, hierarchy, market, and the like”

“ scholars start with different objectives than practitioners”

“ State Activity. How is intelligence conducted by nation-states different from
that of other groups? The definition should not necessarily be limited to states.
However, where should the line be drawn? Certainly, sports teams, businesses, and other
organizations gather information that might provide them with some sort of comparative
advantage. But does that constitute intelligence? “

“ Should the goals of intelligence be included as part of the definition? How does an
intelligence mission relate to theory”

“ the qualities of a good theory.
It must have explanatory power, exhibit parsimony, and allow falsifiability. “

“ intelligence in France was ghettoized in the
military.32 The French never made an attempt to analyze what their
collection—especially that on German reconnaissance flights—was telling them. They
never asked the question “suppose the Germans do something unexpected.”

“ Philip H. J. Davies, Brunel University
For starters, notions of theory should be treated with great skepticism. So should
the idea of a “revolution in intelligence affairs.” Indeed, in the social sciences all of the
most important questions are empirical, as are all of the most important answers.34
Intelligence studies are not “under-theorized,” and indeed, theory should be avoided
wherever possible in the social sciences. Rather, empirical research is essential, but
empirical trends and patterns are not theories.
Here are three provocative hypotheses. First, the development of intelligence
theory and effective intelligence coordination are inversely correlated. Second, theory
building is an attempt to assert intellectual order in the absence of real, institutional order.
Third, the only intelligence theory in the world is American intelligence theory. Theory
building is a consequence either of American emphasis on theory-driven political practice
from a Lockean tradition and the Federalist papers, or a consequence of American
notions of scientific method or professionalism.
For its part, international relations theory is mostly about an attitude towards
international relations rather than any real knowledge of it. So, it is not much help. “

ME: GOD DAMN that is beeyuuteeful

“ The
main schools might be caricatured as follows:
• Realism: everyone’s a bastard, or ought to be;
• Idealism: everyone will be nice to you if you are nice to them, or ought to be;
• Liberalism: everyone can do business, or ought to;
• Rationalism: everyone should balance everyone else against everyone else, or
should at least try;
• Constructivism: everyone is just living out their cultural history whether they are
or not, and ought to be doing so whether they do or not.”

ME: I eneded my reading of this worksop report at this point, as I don’t want to write my entire paper based on this alone,

• Week 2: Theory Integration in Intelligence Research. (n.d.). Retrieved October 13, 2019, from American Military University website: https://edge.apus.edu/portal/site/415305/tool/1cd254c2-0884-4d4e-a317-ae77f6a1f3f7/

Grounded Theory - methodological
• Rational Choice Theory - substantive
• Game Theory - substantive

“theory can play a few separate roles within research “

Eran Zohar, relates grounded theory to intelligence analysis
Zohar, E. (2013). Intelligence Analysis as a Manifestation of a Grounded Theory. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(1), 130–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2012.705659
“Discussions on the theory of intelligence that were supposed to deal with intelligence analysis often drifted into philosophical, epistemological,political, and organizational issues far removed from the working environment of intelligence analysis, or else degenerated into lists ofworking-tips for the analysts. “

“The theme of the Israeli reform was to changethe overall thinking about intelligence. Intelligence analysts were forced toabandon classical modes of thought and work tools (enemy course ofactions, the concept of early-warning) and adopt a higher languagepermeated with sophisticated terminology (‘‘dynamic molecule,’’ ‘‘chaoticsystem,’’ ‘‘synergy,’’ ‘‘diffused warfare,’’ etc. “

“Major characteristics of qualitative analysis are dominant in intelligenceanalysis: use of multiple sources of data, inductive data analysis, and anemergent analysis process. But the intelligence analyst must maintain afocus on learning the meaning that the participants have assigned to aproblem or issue. “+

• Schickler, B. (2010). U.S. intelligence reform: A bureaucratic politics approach. University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida.
  ME: Shickler (2010) examined the bp model in the foreign policy field, and applied it to intelligence studies.
  “ The bureaucratic politics model emerged in 1954”
  “ The final decision, therefore, is a compromised solution that meets the conflicting
  demands, interests, and goals of the actors involved. Importantly, the model reveals that national
  interests and goals are not unified within a bureaucracy and that the policy-making process is far
  from ideal.”
  “ Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, David C. Kozak, James M. Keagle, Morton H.
  Halperin, and Priscilla A. Clapp”

• Durchin, S. (2015). The effects of Hoover’s bureaucratic tactics on COINTELPRO operations: A comparison between NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE. Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Historical Perspective, 25. Washington, D.C.

I describe how Hoover played the bureacractic game with a central eye on protecting the “turf” of the FBI.

Sampson (2012) understands
that bias is normal in research and explains how to mitigate it; “Qualitative researchers contend that
bias is inherent, yet can be described clearly enough to allow the reader to judge if bias has
inappropriately influenced the research”

Sampson, J. (2012). A guide to quantitative and qualitative dissertation research. Florida State
University: Educational Psychology and Learning Systems Faculty Publications.

++ My notes so far
purpose of a theory

• defense of national
• differentitate between democracy and tyranny?
  requirements of a theory.
  Intel as a craft vs a science
• hostility of ivory tower tio field op
  -intel studies as science that intel as art can reference

multiple theories may explain different aspects of intel; there may be no one best model of intel theory.
Focus of theory

• IR
• foreign policy
  -orgabnizational theory
  -contrucivist)
  --speaking truth to power” concept
  -realist (hammer away on contrucivist)
• Scott, L., & Jackson, P. 3 approaches
  universal approach

conclusion – the only way to approach intel theory is to understand it as an aid to intelligence operations, the point of which is to defend the nation. No one theory curently explains “intelligence”, and it is unlikely that there will be one. Some models can explain certain portions of intelligence, and are thus useful in intel ops. A lot of this theory is based on current organizational or IR theory, but that leaves out domestic security, natural disaster, organized crime, and economic prediction, all of which affect national security. These useful theories are all based on empirical modles and on scietific method, not theories based on relativist word-play.

• Svendsen, A. D. M. (2009). Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations. Intelligence and National Security, 24(5), 700–729. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520903209456
  “ As Swedish
  intelligence scholar Wilhelm Agrell has observed: ‘there is no generally
  established theory of intelligence and hence no given theoretical framework
  for the analysis of intelligence liaison.’”

• See Loch K. Johnson, “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative
  Strategy, Vol. 22, No. 1, January 2003)
  Loch
  Johnson notes, “The objective is less to impart new knowledge than to lay out what we
  know in such a manner as to suggest next steps in theory construction

….

• Richards, J. (2010). The art and science of intelligence analysis.