The United States Intelligence Community; Part One

A couple of weeks ago, I completed my first course in an Intelligence Studies masters program; I'll be sharing my work here, and on http://gradschoolfool.blogspot.com/ (my old grad school blog), for anyone interested in this kind of thing.

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In light of the 9/11 Commission Report, the United States Congress authored the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 which reorganized the seventeen Intelligence Community agencies under one central official, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Prior to the IRTPA, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) led the Intelligence Community (IC) while also leading the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Best 2014). The U.S. Congress viewed this as one of the weaknesses of the Intelligence Community which contributed to the atrocities on the 11 September 2001. Since the implementation of the IRTPA however, there have still been questions of what the roles and responsibilities are of the DNI and whether the creation of the position has improved intelligence.
Through this week’s readings and additional research, identify two issues (either benefits, problems, or a combination of the two) associated with the 2004 establishment of the DNI position.

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Boren (1992) highlights “the greatest threat to US national security: people's failure to change their thinking to coincide with all of the changes in the world.”

Even when we change our organizations, we usually don’t change them in lines with the changes of the world, because we don’t change the organizations by thinking about the new changes of the world; we persist in our new changes with old thinking. One change we have made in our Intelligence Community (IC) was as a result of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. This change tasked the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with overall leadership of the IC. How did this change affect the IC?

Before we can identify this kind of issue, we have to understand what the components of the IC are, what affects the operation of the IC, and what the instruments of change to the IC are.

The components of the IC are:

• Primarily, it’s mission to defend America
• It’s organizational structure
• The legal restrictions upon it
• The leadership
• It’s institutional culture (training, choice of personnel)
• It’s history (history relates to all the other issues, and not just the components aspect of the IC)
• Personal relations (formal vs informal); “the quality of personal relationships between the DNI and others who share power within the community will largely determine the extent and pace of future integration and the improved outcomes greater unity is expected to produce.” (Slick, 2014)

Focusing a little closer on the mission of the IC, we need to understand that the collectors go beyond the formal IC member organizations to local and state LE agencies, who are the first line of homeland defense. There are a plethora of private agencies that also participate in collection (Voelz, 2006).

The consumers of the intelligence produced by the IC in performance of their mission include policy makers (both Executive and Legislative), the agencies tasked with the defense of America (nominally led by the Executive, but as we’ll look at downpage, affected by the other branches of government), and ultimately by the citizenry to a limited extent...of course, there are other issues we’ll address when it comes to transparency and accountability.

So, what affects the IC in the performance of it’s mission?

• Fallibility of the analytic process (Hammond, 2010) (Jensen, 2012)
• When policy makers disregard intelligence provided by analysts; a classic example being the Chinese invasion of Korea which Gen. Willoughby played a key part in failing to respond (Haynes, 2009).
• The civil rights of Americans; collection of domestic intelligence versus foreign intelligence, for example. Privacy and liberty issues.
• The autonomy of intelligence agencies to perform their missions (or conversely, to go off-track) versus political interference (again conversely, correct political control). This is a focus of Keller’s book, The liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and fall of a domestic intelligence state.
• The danger of political interference in the IC mission.
• Organizational issues including but not limited to... (stovepiping, vulnerability of centralization, duplication of functions, “And here's something else, Bob: I have eight different bosses right now.”). One note on centralization is related by Van Hook (2009), “Rumsfeld stated, ‘There may be ways we can strengthen intelligence, but centralization is most certainly not one of them.’”
• The efficiency (and sometimes necessity) of secrecy versus the accountability and transparency required by a functioning republic
• The related concepts of growth complex/burrocratic politcs model/ Pournelle’s iron law of burrocracy which lead to infighting, empire building, and organizational focus shifting away from the IC mission. A very interesting look at how our burrocracies have been formed in ways that have moved them away from Constitutional control can be found in James Wilson’s Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It. Also see “organizational resistance” below.
• An example of such infighting can be found built into our laws: “Title 10” is used colloquially to refer to military operations, while “Title 50” refers to intelligence agencies and intelligence activities (Wall, 2011).
• A different example of agency in-fighting relates to different organizational goals. Hammond (2007) contrasts the intelligence mission of the CIA to the crime-fighting mission of the FBI in how these agencies may try to handle a terrorism case.
• The “Wikipedization” of our intelligence agencies; neither Bradley Manning nor Edward Snowden should have had access to that amount of data that had nothing to do with their own responsibilities.
• Subversion and/or corruption of command lines in IC agencies; Loewenstein (1937) warned of the dangers of one party control of government appartus. Depending on one’s interpretation of the “Spygate” controversy surrounding the 2016 election, this danger becomes apparent.
• Fear of failure and scapegoating. Stimson and Habeck (2016) note that “it is also true that the intelligence community is often the whipping boy for national security policy mistakes. It is far too easy for policymakers and political leadership to blame errors of judgment and policy on the IC rather than take responsibility for their own failings.”
• In tandem with the fear of failure, and in conjunction with political interference, there can also the fear of doing the job correctly. Powers (2004) argues that due to overaggressive “reformers”, FBI agents were too “politically correct” to efficiently conduct domestic surveillance where such was warranted. Would anyone like to do a count of the number of terror attacks over the last 10 years in which the terrorists had previously been known to the IC?
• Organizational resistance to change. While this is a known phenomena in organizational study, it is likely magnified by the kind of ineffective reform the IC has seen over the course of it’s post-WWII timeline. Neary (2010) observed that “many professionals looked at the reform brouhaha with detached bemusement, believing reform would result in no meaningful change. There was ample historical evidence for this view: the community had been the subject of 14 studies in its first 60 years, with the vast majority resulting in little substantial change.”

There are several instruments of change that define the legal organization, duties, and relationships within the IC. These are Executive orders, Presidential directives, Acts of Congress, Departmental regulations, and Memorandums of agreement/understanding. Although the defense of the country is an Executive responsibility, it has always been understood that the Legislative branch has it’s own role to play.

Now that we have an overview of what the IC is, and how it is impacted in the performance of it’s mission, we can look at the two most important issues related to the creation of the DNI position. Keep in mind that several of the issues that affect the IC have no easy answer (i.e, secrecy vs. transparency), that many of the issues are interconnected, and that nominally, the DNI is responsible for navigating the IC in a manner consistent with it’s mission in the face of these issues.

Ideally, the DNI would handle that responsibility with honesty and the interest of the mission foremost, but that brings up the issue that can be considered the most problematic with the establishment of the office: the related concepts of growth complex/burrocratic politcs model/ Pournelle’s iron law of burrocracy.

In this case, we will look at James Clapper, DNI from 2010-2017. His actions during the “Spygate” controversy show a commitment to protect the image of the IC, whether or not he was an active participant in unethical or illegal behavior.

“About one matter no uncertainty exists: Obama intelligence chieftains John Brennan and James Clapper, after they left office, went immediately on the airwaves to promote the story that Mr. Trump was a Russian agent.”
(Jenkins, 2019)

The idea that Trump is a Russian asset is something that the Mueller report has completely discredited. Certainly, the DOJ OIG has referred both James Comey and Andrew McCabe for criminal prosecution for actions related to “Spygate”.(U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2019)(Osburn, 2019) (U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2018)(Demirjian & Zapotosky, 2018).

However, the accusation that Trump was a Russian ally certainly would justify the actions taken by the IC in the public eye, that is, if the accusations were true. Considering we are still in fact-finding mode on the “Spygate” case in toto case at present, we shall see. My definition of “Spygate” envelops all government activities relating to Clinton from the time her illegal email server was publicized to actions taken to protect both Clinton and those people in the government that aided her.

It is possible that investigation into the “Spygate” controversy reveals subversion in the IC chain of command, especially in the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, but also connected to the DNI who should have been on top of unethical and/or biased investigation into political rivals. If this is true, it also reveals the vulnerability of centralization. It also demonstrates how the often necessary requirements of secrecy can be used to protect IC autonomy from accountability. Another issue this brings up is the question of who is ultimately responsible for counterintelligence operations involving the FBI; is is the DNI, or is it the AG? The right answer? The President, but he delegates authority, right? Again, many of the problems that can hinder the IC are intertwined.

A second issue involved with the creation of the DNI position is the probability that it does not effectively address the problems it was intended to resolve. Even though the DNI is supposedly in charge of the entire IC, the position does not provide administrative control over subordinate agencies. As Stimson and Habeck (2016) observe, “This is an authorities issue, bureaucratic problem, and personality challenge combined” (yet again demonstrating how often these problems overlap).

Best (2010), in a Congressional Research Service report, discusses several organizational issues related to the DNI postion. He references a President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) report which “found ambiguities in the Intelligence Reform Act” and recommended yet another reorganization of the ODNI. The Neary article in the references section is a full criticism of the DNI postion, and Best summarizes it fully. In a later article, Best (2014) describes the “ hard bargaining that was required to pass” the legislation; he also found “ambiguous language provided ample opportunity for future differences of opinion”. He refers specifically to budgetary control (he who controls the purse strings…).

This image of a powerless DNI contradicts the idea of an all powerful, fully corrupted DNI, doesn’t it? As I’ve stated, these dilemmas don’t have easy answers. The point that Boren makes at the beginning of this discussion is key. We do not think in terms of a changing world; we don’t even recognize the mistakes we have previously made. Organizational restructuring has been called for after disaster, locking us into a cycle of chasing crescive change. Reform after reform has left us subject to the problems discussed. These problems take the IC off-mission, and have left us subject to multiple terror attacks.

This has been a fairly long-winded discussion post. On one hand, I may have included too much information, on the other hand, I think it is hard to understand complicated problems without understanding the big picture. If you were able to read the whole thing without nodding out, I salute you!

REFERENCES:

Best, R. A. (2010). Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) (No. R41295; p. 14). Retrieved from Congressional Research Service : https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41295.pdf

Best, R. A. (2014). Leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community: From DCI to DNI. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27(2), 253–333. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.872533

Boren, D. L. (1992, Summer). The Intelligence Community: How Crucial? Foreign Affairs, 71(3), 52.

Demirjian, K., & Zapotosky, M. (2018, April 19). Inspector general referred findings on McCabe to U.S. attorney for consideration of criminal charges. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inspector-general-referred-findings-on-mccabe-to-us-attorney-for-consideration-of-criminal-charges/2018/04/19/a200cabc-43f3-11e8-8569-26fda6b404c7_story.html

Hammond, T. H. (2007). Why Is the Intelligence Community So Difficult to Redesign? Smart Practices, Conflicting Goals, and the Creation of Purpose-Based Organizations. Governance, 20(3), 401–422. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00364.x

Hammond, T. H. (2010). Intelligence Organizations and the Organization of Intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23(4), 680–724. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850601003780987

Haynes, J. M. (2009). Intelligence failure in Korea: Major General Charles A. Willoughby‘s role in the United Nations command‘s defeat in November, 1950. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Jenkins, H. W. (2019, May 7). Opinion | Motive Matters in Trump Spygate. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/motive-matters-in-trump-spygate-11557268983

Jensen, M. A. (2012). Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them? Intelligence & National Security, 27(2), 261–282. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.661646

Keller, W. W. (1989). The liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and fall of a domestic intelligence state. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Loewenstein, K. (1937). Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I. The American Political Science Review, 31(3), 417. https://doi.org/10.2307/1948164

Loewenstein, K. (1937). Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II. The American Political Science Review, 31(4), 638. https://doi.org/10.2307/1948103

Neary, P. C. (2010). Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace? Studies in Intelligence, 54(1), 16.

Osburn, M. (2019, August 1). DOJ IG Referred James Comey For Criminal Prosecution For Leaking Classified Information. The Federalist. Retrieved from https://thefederalist.com/2019/08/01/doj-ig-referred-james-comey-criminal-prosecution-leaking-classified-information/

Powers, R. G. (2004). A Bomb with a LONG FUSE: 9/11 and the FBI “reforms” of the 1970s. American History, 39(5), 42–47.

Slick, S. B. (2014). Modernizing the IC “Charter”: The 2008 Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities. Studies in Intelligence, 58(2), 18.

Stimson, C., & Habeck, M. (2016). Reforming Intelligence: A Proposal for Reorganizing the Intelligence Community and Improving Analysis. Retrieved September 17, 2019, from The Heritage Foundation website: https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/reforming-intelligence-proposal-reorganizing-the-intelligence-community-and

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General. (2018). A Report of Investigation of Certain Allegations Relating to Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe. Retrieved from https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/o20180413.pdf

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General. (2019). Report of Investigation of Former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey’s Disclosure of Sensitive Investigative Information and Handling of Certain Memoranda (p. 83). Retrieved from https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/o1902.pdf

Van Hook, L.W. (2009). Reforming Intelligence: The Passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Retrieved from Office of the Director of National Intelligence website: https://fas.org/irp/dni/reform-ocr.pdf

Voelz, G. J. (2006). Managing the Private Spies: Use of Commercial Augmentation for Intelligence Operations: https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA476310

Wall, A. E. (2011). Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action. Harvard National Security Journal, 3, 58.

Wilson, J. (1991). Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.

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Class Discussion
You bring up a good point that I missed in my post about problems the IC has to work through, which is the use of raw data. There is a balance here as well; some valid raw data may be stovepiped or simply missed by the analyst.
But it is the analyst's job to analyze...to not make those mistakes.
Hulnick (2006) makes this point; and he addresses another issue that your discussion on raw data brings up. That is the use of raw data by policy makers. Hulnick notes that raw data is often provided to policy makers at the same time that it is provided to analysts. And since we know that " some of this raw intelligence may be incomplete, contradictory, or just wrong", something that the IC cannot control is decision-making based on that data.
Hulnick also states that the flow of raw data to policy makers cannot be cut off. Personally, I think that he is wrong, but that it would take a great deal more of public concern to get the policy makers to cut themselves off from data they can use to their political advantage.

Hulnick, A. S. (2006). What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence & National Security, 21(6), 959–979.

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By "fallibility of the analytic process", I mean the inherent possibility that analysis can be wrong, even before we take into account any of the other problems that can interfere with analysis.
A couple of problems:

• Humans are biased through our personality,experience, and education. Institutions (made up of humans) can also be biased though organizational history and culture. One example is the mutual misperception of intent leading up to the second U.S.-Iraq war. Duelfer and Dyson (2011) note that Hussein believed that America would not try to force him out of office through a full invasion based upon prior American action towards other regional dictators. On the other hand, we took Hussein's bluff regarding possession of WMD seriously, although he was directing that towards the Iranians (there are several such examples going both ways in Duelfer's article).
• Collection of data can be flawed; collection design plans can miss areas of collection. Hulnick (2006) also points out that "raw intelligence may be incomplete, contradictory, or just wrong".
  Hulnick also suggests Richard K. Betts, ‘Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable’, World Politics 31 (1978), but I haven't got to that yet in my reading.
  ...
  Whether any DNI is a stooge or not depends on whether the Presidents choose one or not; depending on political opposition, the accusation of being a stooge is always possible! So each case, or accusation, has to be weighed carefully. Also keep in mind that the DNI position requires Senate confirmation, so the President is limited to choices the Senate approves; Ratcliffe's recent nomination for the position was pulled due to this political process.
  ...
  As to references, I will suggest the use of Zotero (https://www.zotero.org/). I used it for my first masters, and still use it for my writing.
  • It can download articles and save them to your computer
  • It let's you organize your researched articles by tag
  • It will save/store media of many types
  • You can add notes to any given entry
  • It has a metadata search function (it can look up the reference data for many PDFs)
  • If you are studying or putting together professional articles, it can autoformat the relevant citations and references

References:
Duelfer, C. A., & Dyson, S. B. (2011). Chronic Misperception and International Confict:The U.S.-Iraq Experience. International Security, 36(1), 28.

Hulnick, A. S. (2006). What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence & National Security, 21(6), 959–979.