RE: Where are the Votes (SP) going?

The options are purely theoretical of course. We could use the inflation rate to calculate the theoretical distribution curve over time using each of the options, where option 3 could be split in a lot of different subcurves. But what would that show?

I don't have the exact numbers at hand, but roundabout they should be fine:
inflation rate: 10% (for the sake of rounding, it's actually lower)
a) dao 10%
b) witness 10%
c) inflation on SP 15%
d) curation 32.5%
e) posts 32.5%

Self voters receive 80% (c+d+e) of the total inflation and leave 20% for witnesses and the dao - both basically developers and (self-)marketers.

Burning the posting rewards removes e) and changes the remaining as follows:
inflation rate: 6.75%
a) 14.8%
b) 14.8%
c) 22.2%
d) 48.1%

Now we have 70% of the inflation for the burn voters, and 30% for witnesses and the dao. Not a huge change in percentages and still no distribution outside of those two groups.

For option 3 let's assume curators who vote 50% established, 50% new users (which is pretty optimistic). The percentages are the same as for option 1, so:
20% for witnesses and dao, 63.75% for stakeholders and 16.25% for new users.
16.25% of 10% inflation mean a dilution of 1.625%.
With votes going 100% to non-stakeholders that would switch to 47.5:32.5, bringing the maximum possible dilution to 3.25%

Okay, now to the interesting part :D To calculate the real effect regarding dilution of stake, we need to include the vesting ratio. Hopefully more or less accurate numbers I found quickly state that 210M Steem are powered up, at a total of 360M, which results in a ratio of 58.3%, let's say 60. This means that 40% of stake which the inflation rate is based on gives up on their share on c and d, leaving it for the rest to grab. It factually raises the rewards, giving the ones using c and d 66% more rewards than if all stake was active.

1000 STEEM created actually distribute the following way:

option 1&3:
a) 76
b) 76
c) 189
d) 412
e) 247

option 2:
a) 101
b) 101
c) 252
d) 546

So - while option 1 leads to a self-allocation of 85%, option 2 lowers that to 80%, leaving the other 5% to witnesses and the dao.
Option 3 allocates 60% of the inflation to the voters.

Conclusions:

I) The maximum distribution rate if all votes would go to non-stakeholders is 2.5% of the total stake per year, plus 1.5% via witnesses and dao, resulting in a total maximum dilution of 4% per year. All those values are actually lower, because I think the inflation rate is closer to 8% than 10%.

II) Burning post rewards only has a minimal effect on self-allocation of inflation compared to self-voting. In this purely theoretic scenario at least. In reality there are a lot more factors, for example that an individual using option 1 hurts everyone else, while option 2 is neutral in that regard.